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Activism for Corporate Responsibility: Conceptualizing Private Regulation 
Opportunity Structures 
 
ABSTRACT 
In this paper, we examine how private regulatory initiatives (PRIs) – which define 
standards for corporate responsibility (CR) issues and sometimes monitor their application by 
firms – create opportunities and constraints for activist groups aiming to push firms toward 
more stringent CR activities. Drawing on social movement theory, we conceptualize how 
private regulation opportunity structures affect such CR-based activist groups’ targets and 
tactics at both the firm and field levels. At the field level, we argue that both radical and 
reformative activist groups direct most of their time and resources towards PRIs with 
comparatively more stringent standards. At the firm level, while radical activist groups are 
likely to target firms participating in more stringent PRIs, reformative activist groups target 
firms participating in less stringent PRIs, or those that do not participate in PRIs at all. When 
facing unfavorable opportunity structures, CR-based activist groups tend either to advocate 
the creation of new PRIs or to shift their activities to pressure other focal points. This paper 
contributes to moving beyond extant literature’s emphasis of PRIs as settlements of 
contentious firm-activist interactions towards also viewing them as starting points for activist 
groups aiming to push firms toward more substantive CR engagement. 
 
Keywords: activism, corporate responsibility, political opportunity structures, private 
regulation, private regulatory initiatives, social movements  
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In 2005, the environmental activist group Friends of the Earth pressured several firms 
– including UK’s largest retailer, Tesco – to engage in the Roundtable on Sustainable Palm 
Oil (RSPO), a private regulatory initiative (PRI) aimed at designing standards to ensure 
sustainable palm oil sourcing and prevent deforestation (Friends of the Earth, 2005). Tesco 
and most of the other pressured firms joined the RSPO, but four years later Friends of the 
Earth withdrew its support for the PRI, criticizing both participating firms and the RSPO 
itself, which the activist group described as a ‘smokescreen’ (Friends of the Earth, 2009).  
This case illustrates several points that are important for our paper. First, firms are 
increasingly expected to undertake a variety of corporate responsibility (CR) activities to 
address social, environmental, and ethical issues (Scherer and Palazzo, 2007, 2011; Scherer, 
Palazzo, and Baumann, 2006). Second, firms usually engage in CR activities in response to 
pressure, in particular from activist groups (Baron, 2001; King and Pearce, 2010; Proffitt and 
Spicer, 2006). Third, PRIs – regulatory bodies that define, and sometimes monitor and 
enforce the application of private rules (such as standards or codes of conduct) aimed at 
regulating firms’ activities with regard to CR issues – have become a new focal point for CR-
based activists. And fourth, the existence of PRIs modifies CR-based activism: on the one 
hand, activist groups can now target PRIs – rather than individual firms or the state – to 
advance CR issues (e.g. Schepers, 2010), but at the same time, PRIs provide activist groups 
with additional leverage when targeting individual firms (such as Tesco in the above 
example) (Turcotte, de Bellefeuille, and Den Hond, 2007; Yaziji and Doh, 2009).  
However, research to date has only theorized about the state and the individual 
corporation as focal points for CR-based activism, and has not considered when and how the 
existence of PRIs influences the activities of CR-based activist groups (Soule, 2012a; 
Timmermans and Epstein, 2010; Turcotte et al., 2007). We address this gap by examining 
how PRIs’ opportunity structures impact the ways in which different types of CR-based 
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activist groups (radical and reformative) mobilize. PRIs differ from nation-states and 
corporations, so current knowledge about how these two traditional focal points influence 
CR-based activism cannot simply be transposed unaltered to PRIs. For example, unlike the 
application of national legislation to clearly delimited territories (i.e. country borders), PRIs 
oftentimes regulate companies operating in multiple countries, and, in many cases, multiple 
PRIs regulate the same CR issue (Cashore, Van Kooten, Vertinsky, Auld, and Affolderbach, 
2005; Reinecke, Manning, and Von Hagen, 2012; Zietsma and McKnight, 2009).  
To develop our argument, we draw on social movement theory’s core insight that 
regulatory institutions – such as states, markets, or PRIs – beyond having stabilizing effects, 
are also always “objects of power struggles and thus subject to conflict and contentiousness” 
(King and Pearce, 2010, p. 250). In particular, we build on the social movement concept of 
political opportunity structures (POS): the structural and cultural characteristics of regulatory 
institutions that enable or constrain activist mobilization (Kriesi, Koopmans, Duyvendak, and 
Giugni, 1992; McAdam, 1996; Tarrow, 1998). The POS perspective is adapted to our enquiry 
as we examine how certain characteristics of PRIs – understood as regulatory institutions – 
affect CR-based activism. Our main arguments are on the one hand that, at the field level, 
both radical and reformative activist groups direct most of their time and resources towards 
PRIs that have comparatively more stringent standards. On the other hand, at the firm level, 
while radical activist groups are likely to target firms participating in stringent PRIs, 
reformative activist groups target firms participating in less stringent PRIs, or those that do 
not participate in PRIs at all. When facing unfavorable opportunity structures, CR-based 
activist groups either advocate the creation of new PRIs, or shift their activities to pressure 
focal points other than PRIs – such as the state. 
We contribute to expanding the literature on the dynamics of confrontation and 
collaboration between firms, activist groups and PRIs in the area of CR. Most current 
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literature treats PRIs as settlements between actors, and as stable outcomes of firm-activist 
interactions (e.g. Baron, 2003; Bartley, 2011; Helms, Oliver, and Webb, 2012). For example, 
reputation studies find that firms create PRIs as means to pacify critical activist groups, and 
to mitigate reputational problems (Fombrun, Gardberg, and Barnett, 2000; King and Lenox, 
2000; Wright and Rwabizambuga, 2006). Research in ‘private politics’ depicts PRIs as 
settlements to what are often highly mediatized conflicts between activist groups and firms 
(Baron, 2003, 2009; Bartley, 2007, 2011). And advocates for a political view of CR deem 
adequately designed PRIs as ideal fora in which firms and stakeholders can collaborate to 
design appropriate CR policies and oversee their implementation (Palazzo and Scherer, 2008; 
Scherer and Palazzo, 2007, 2011). While all these approaches underline the importance of 
contention and power struggles between activist groups and firms before – and potentially 
leading to – the creation of PRIs, our core contribution here is to show and elaborate on how 
PRIs can provide the ground upon which subsequent and altered contention between CR-
based activist groups and firms takes place. 
Conceiving private regulation in this way has several important implications for 
theory and practice. First, in contrast to most extant studies, we argue that firms’ participation 
in PRIs does not necessarily settle conflicts and pacify activist groups. Second, in line with 
recent calls in organization theory for greater understanding of contentious processes (King 
and Pearce, 2010), we provide a conceptualization of how PRIs influence both challengers 
(i.e. CR-based activist groups) and incumbents (i.e. firms) (King, 2008b; Soule, 2012a; van 
Wijk, Stam, Elfring, Zietsma, and den Hond, 2013; Whetten, Felin, and King, 2009). Third, 
we enhance knowledge about how external pressures to deal with CR issues are brought to 
firms’ attention (Delmas and Toffel, 2004; Schrempf-Stirling and Palazzo, 2013; Sharma and 
Henriques, 2005). As private regulation modifies their playing fields, companies and their 
managers need to understand how the existence of PRIs influences activist pressure, which is 
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essential if firms hope to navigate the increasingly complex CR landscape.  
We start by providing an overview of PRIs in Section 2, and then review in Section 3 
our conceptual grounding in social movement theory. In Section 4, we develop our 
overarching argument by examining the routes that CR-based activist groups can take, the 
dimensions of PRIs’ opportunity structures, and how different types of CR-based activist 
groups can leverage those opportunities, advocate the creation of new PRIs, or shift to other 
focal points in their attempts to advance CR. Section 5 concludes with a discussion of our 
framework.  
 
PRIVATE REGULATORY INITIATIVES 
PRIs are generally seen as the result of political contestation and power struggles 
between stakeholders and firms about CR issues (Bartley, 2007, 2011; Timmermans and 
Epstein, 2010; Zietsma and McKnight, 2009), whose creation requires some enabling 
conditions. First, at least some firms concerned with the focal CR issue must be willing to 
participate in setting up the PRI, since compliance with PRI standards is voluntary (Zietsma 
and McKnight, 2009). Several reasons can lead to firms’ willingness to participate. In some 
instances, proactive firms with higher social or environmental performances than their 
competitors may support the creation of PRIs to constitute barriers to entry and so secure 
competitive advantage over laggards (Baron, 2009; Gardberg and Fombrun, 2006; 
McWilliams and Siegel, 2011; McWilliams, Siegel, and Wright, 2006; Mügge, 2006). At 
other times, the entire industry may push for private regulation, especially if it feels its 
reputation is at stake (Barnett, 2006; Fombrun et al., 2000; Hoffman, 1999). Second, the 
participation of civil society groups can be another pre-condition for the constitution of PRIs: 
such organizations may see particular value in PRIs, as providing a means to regulate and 
monitor multiple corporations at the same time (Esbenshade, 2004; Katz, Higgins, Dickson, 
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and Eckman, 2009; Locke, Qin, and Brause, 2007). Third, the creation of PRIs sometimes 
requires government support, especially those that certify firms and provide labels for 
products (Bartley, 2007; Mügge, 2006). 
As different types of stakeholders – firms, civil society organizations, and 
governments – can be involved in the creation of PRIs, different configurations of these 
stakeholders may also be involved in their governance. Abbott and Snidal (2009a, b, 2010) 
categorize PRIs as being governed by one, two, or three of those types of stakeholdersi:  
Table 1 provides examples of these different PRI categories. Even if they are involved in the 
governance of a PRI, the amount of power each stakeholder group holds varies from PRI to 
PRI. Some give equal voting power to the different stakeholders, whereas others give more 
(or even all the) weight to one type of stakeholder (e.g. to firms) (Black, 2008; Fransen, 2012; 
Schepers, 2010). The question of which type of stakeholders participate in a PRI bears 
important consequences for its activities, such as monitoring firm compliance. For example, 
corporations self-monitor compliance in some PRIs, while monitoring is undertaken by the 
PRI itself, or by independent third-party organizations – such as audit companies – in others 
(Gereffi, Garcia-Johnson, and Sasser, 2001; Marx, 2008; O'Rourke, 2006; van Tulder and 
Kolk, 2001). So PRIs may differ from each other in structures and processes, and – as Table 1 
also illustrates – can emerge at different points in time to regulate the same CR issue. 
 
-------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 1 ABOUT HERE 
-------------------------------------------- 
 
CONCEPTUAL GROUNDING 
Core to social movement research is an understanding of the social world as 
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intimately contentious, and as one in which outsider groups challenge established social and 
regulatory institutions (such as the state, firms, or PRIs) in their attempts to make their claims 
heard and bring about social or political change (King and Pearce, 2010; Tarrow, 1998; Tilly 
and Tarrow, 2007; Weber, Heinze, and DeSoucey, 2008; Weber, Rao, and Thomas, 2009). In 
comparison to other theories examining social change and stability – such as neo-
institutionalismii – social movement theory focuses particularly on contention, and on the 
activities of organized challenger groups. As this theory has also already been applied to CR-
based activism (e.g. Arjaliès, 2010; den Hond and de Bakker, 2007; King, 2008b; King and 
Soule, 2007; Reid and Toffel, 2009; Soule, 2009), we adopt it as an adequate theoretical lens 
for our endeavors in this article.  
 
Social Movements and Different Types of Activist Groups 
Social movements are made up of several, more or less organized, individuals and 
groups with a general preference for, or resistance to, change concerning some aspect of 
social life (McAdam, Tarrow, and Tilly, 2001; McCarthy and Zald, 1977; Tarrow, 2011; 
Tilly and Tarrow, 2007). We define CR-based activism as the mobilization of existing activist 
groups, which may have different attitudes and employ different tactics, but are motivated by 
the same goal: improving firm practices with respect to social, environmental, or ethical CR 
issues. We focus on groups rather than individual activists because it is mostly existing 
activist groups who pressure firms to have greater CR engagement (e.g. Clean Clothes 
Campaign, Amnesty International, etc.) (Spar and La Mure, 2003), who either participate in 
or criticize PRIs (Turcotte et al., 2007; Yaziji and Doh, 2009), and who have the capacity to 
sustain their efforts for change in regulatory institutions over extended periods of time (King, 
2008b). Indeed, we are not interested here in the micro-processes that lead individuals to 
form and sustain activist groups, but rather in how PRIs affect the activities of different 
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existing activist groups that take private regulation as their focal point. 
While different activist groups of particular social movements share the same goal (in 
our case, increasing firms’ engagement in CR), they possess varying ideologies and are often 
split into radical and reformative (or moderate) branches (Koopmans, 2004; Rowley and 
Moldoveanu, 2003; Rucht, 2004; Williams, 2004; Zald, 2000), an ideology-based distinction 
which has already been used to examine CR-based activism (e.g. de Bakker, 2012; den Hond 
and de Bakker, 2007; Derville, 2005; van Huijstee and Glasbergen, 2010; Vitols, 2011; Yaziji 
and Doh, 2013). This literature, while acknowledging that activist groups’ ideologies may 
change over the long term, emphasizes that “[t]he concept of ideology comprises an 
interconnected set of beliefs and attitudes relating to problematic aspects of social and 
political topics that are shared and used by members of a group and that inform and justify 
choice and behavior” (den Hond and de Bakker, 2007, p. 903). As activist groups are likely to 
have limited time and resources, they must decide which target(s) to prioritize and which 
tactics to use, a choice largely informed by their – radical or reformative – ideologies (Zald, 
2000). 
  We conceive of radical CR-based activist groups as those that emphasize problems 
with respect to firms’ activities on CR issues (den Hond and de Bakker, 2007). Such groups 
tend to be critical of firms’ intermediary steps toward addressing CR issues (Phillips, 2003) – 
they assess firms’ CR activities in absolute rather than relative terms, and do not evaluate 
positively firms that are more proactive than others. Rather, radicals only evaluate proactive 
firms positively if they address CR issues in ways radicals consider entirely satisfactory 
(Derville, 2005). Hence, in their efforts to continuously ‘raise the bar’, these radical activist 
groups spend much of their time and resources deinstitutionalizing what are considered 
current CR best practices, but which they consider only as unsatisfactory, intermediary 
solutions (den Hond and de Bakker, 2007). Consequently, radical activist groups concentrate 
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on targeting and criticizing more advanced and proactive firms (Yaziji and Doh, 2009), and 
typically prefer disruptive, non-institutionalized tactics, that gain high media and public 
attention (Derville, 2005; Williams, 2004; Zald, 2000). 
 In contrast, reformative activist groups emphasize the importance of achieving 
workable solutions (Williams, 2004) – even if they do not immediately address CR issues 
comprehensively. Such groups value best practices as intermediary solutions and necessary 
steps towards stronger firm measures (Testy, 2002). Reformatives’ moderate ideologies lead 
them to acknowledge firms as part of potential solutions – as well as (obviously) part of the 
problems. Hence, such groups evaluate firms in relative, rather than only in absolute terms: 
they favor proactive over laggard firms, where they perceive such proactivity as steps 
towards substantially improving CR issues in the long-term. Hence (given the choice) 
reformative CR-based activist groups will tend to focus their time and resources on working 
with proactive firms, as well as criticizing laggard firms at times (den Hond and de Bakker, 
2007; Vitols, 2011). They spend most of their efforts institutionalizing implementable 
solutions, preferring more constructive and institutionalized tactics (Goldstone, 2004; Snow, 
Soule, and Kriesi, 2004; Tarrow, 2011; Williams, 2004; Zald, 2000), especially when 
interacting with proactive firms, but they also employ disruptive tactics toward laggards (den 
Hond and de Bakker, 2007). 
This distinction implies important differences in radical and reformative activist 
groups’ relative perceptions of PRIs as potential solutions to CR issues. Where PRIs might 
constitute partial solutions, they are rarely seen as perfect by groups of either type (Graz and 
Nölke, 2008; Haufler, 2003). But, overall, reformative activist groups are more likely to be 
sympathetic towards PRIs than are radicals. While radical activist groups tend to perceive 
firms as antagonists, to be excluded from solutions to CR issues (den Hond and de Bakker, 
2007), we argue that they can nevertheless decide to endorse and even to participate in PRIs. 
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This is more likely to be the case when the PRI gives substantially less power to firms than to 
the activist groups themselves. In such situations, because it allows them to further their goals 
(firms’ more stringent CR engagement) directly, radical activist groups are likely to use 
institutionalized, rather than their conventionally preferred disruptive tactics. It should be 
noted that, while we make a binary differentiation between radical and reformative activist 
groups, their ideologies are better understood as a continuum between two extremes, along 
which any particular group’s ideology can be characterized as taking an intermediate state. 
For example, some extremely radical activist groups will probably never see PRIs as a 
legitimate solution to a CR issue – we assume that such groups will seek to change firms’ 
behavior exclusively via other focal points than private regulation (such as changing state 
laws). However – and as others have done before (den Hond and de Bakker, 2007; Yaziji and 
Doh, 2013) – we treat ideology as dichotomous for conceptualization purposes, and we 
address the issue of ideological change over time in the discussion section.  
 
Political Opportunity Structures 
There are three general lines of inquiry in social movement theory. A first line 
investigates the formal and informal ways in which activist groups are organized – their 
mobilizing structures (McAdam, McCarthy, and Zald, 1996) – while a second examines their 
framing processes, and looks at how activist groups “[…] assign meaning to and interpret, 
relevant events and conditions in ways that are intended to mobilize potential adherents and 
constituents, to garner bystander support, and to demobilize antagonists” (Snow and Benford, 
1988, p. 198). The core of this paper mostly concerns a third line of inquiry, which focuses 
on political opportunity structures (POS) (Kitschelt, 1986; Kriesi et al., 1992; Meyer and 
Minkoff, 2004; Williams, 2004). This POS perspective investigates toward which focal 
points activist groups deploy most of their time and resources, how and why they might move 
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from one focal point to another (scale shift), and how a particular focal point’s characteristics 
impact on how different types of activist groups mobilize (Tarrow, 2011; Williams, 1994). As 
these are the main issues we address in this paper, we build on the POS perspective and 
translate it to the area of private regulation.  
POS are “consistent – but not necessarily formal or permanent – dimensions of the 
political environment that provide incentives for collective action by affecting people’s 
expectations for success or failure” (Tarrow, 1998, p. 76). These dimensions have been 
developed for the different focal points that activists target, most often the state – national 
POS (Kitschelt, 1986; Kriesi et al., 1992; Kriesi, Koopmans, Duyvendak, and Giugni, 1995; 
Tarrow, 1994) – but also international organizations such as the World Bank or the United 
Nations – international POS (Graubart, 2005; Shawki, 2010; van der Heijden, 2006).  
In his review, McAdam (1996) identified four main dimensions of both national and 
international POS. First, the formal institutional structure of a regulatory system typically 
refers to its openness to participation. Second, its informal structure reflects the configuration 
of the power of elites in polities, and their strategies and attitudes toward challengers (Kriesi 
et al., 1992). Third, the presence of allies within the regulatory system is likely to increase the 
chances of successful mobilization, as they can give activist groups superior access to the 
polity. Finally, the repression ability and propensity of the state is likely to trigger or reduce 
activism (Tarrow, 1998). In the case of international POS, this last dimension is referred to as 
the political output structure, or how the international organization can enforce and monitor 
compliance with its rules and treaties (van der Heijden, 2006). 
Despite the different conceptualizations and wide use of POS (e.g. beyond national 
and international POS, the POS perspective has also been extended to examine corporate or 
industry opportunity structures, see King, 2008b; Schurman, 2004; Soule, 2009, 2012b), this 
perspective has been criticized, notably for putting too much determinacy on structures and 
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too little emphasis on dynamic interactions between activist groups and those structures (see 
e.g. Goldstone, 2004; Goodwin and Jasper, 1999). We believe that our conceptualization of 
private regulation opportunity structures avoids most of these problems. First, as the POS 
perspective becomes stronger when examining multiple focal points cross-sectionally (e.g. 
Kriesi et al., 1995; Soule and King, 2006; van der Heijden, 1997), rather than a single focal 
point longitudinally (see also Goldstone, 2004), we compare how the opportunity structures 
of multiple existing PRIs regulating a CR issue are likely to influence the activities of CR-
based activist groups. Second, and relatedly, our framework considers under what 
circumstances CR-based activist groups are likely to divert their efforts from PRIs to other 
focal points – moves the social movement literature describes as ‘scale shifts’ (Della Porta 
and Tarrow, 2005; Schneiberg and Soule, 2005; Soule, 2009; Tarrow, 2005). This 
conceptualization of POS, in which activist groups can shift the scale of their activities from 
one focal point to another, allows for assessing how these focal points impact activism, while 
not conceiving POS as determining every aspect of activist groups’ activities (Tarrow, 2011). 
Third, in considering these groups’ ideologies, we do not assume that opportunity structures 
alone predict their activities (Goodwin and Jasper, 1999; Tarrow, 1994), but rather how those 
activities are influenced both by groups’ ideologies and by the opportunity structures that are 
available (Koopmans and Statham, 1999).  
 
CR-BASED ACTIVISM AND PRIVATE REGULATION 
In this section, we expand existing conceptions of opportunity structures to private 
regulation, by conceptualizing private regulation opportunity structures (PROS) and how they 
affect the activities of radical and reformative CR-based activist groups when they take 
private regulation – rather than the corporation or the state – as a focal point. Figure 1 
illustrates this paper’s undertaking graphically. 
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----------------------------------------------- 
INSERT FIGURE 1 ABOUT HERE 
----------------------------------------------- 
 
First – (a) in Figure 1 – we examine how the existence of PRIs modifies both the firm 
and field level routes that activist groups usually take to bring broader change in CR. CR-
based activist groups either aim at instigating changes in individual firms’ behaviors – the 
firm level route – or in those of multiple firms at the same time – the field level route (den 
Hond and de Bakker, 2007; Soule, 2009). Second, (b), we conceptualize PROS via an 
analogy to international POS. As several different PRIs usually address a same CR issue, the 
distinct PROS of these initiatives will influence the activities of CR-based activist groups in 
different ways. Third, (c), we examine how these different PROS affect four main activities 
of radical and reformative CR-based activist groups when taking private regulation as their 
focal point of contention. We look at how PROS and activist groups’ ideologies influence 
their choices as to where to spend most of their time and resources to pressure for CR change 
when taking (i) the field level route (Propositions 1, 2a and 2b) and (ii) the firm level route 
(Propositions 3, 4a and 4b). As CR-based activist groups may find themselves short of 
opportunities when taking private regulation as their focal point, they might therefore (iii) 
advocate the creation of new PRIs (Proposition 5), or (iv) leave the private regulation arena to 
shift their scale of contention toward other focal points altogether (Proposition 6). 
 
(a) Private Regulation and Routes for CR-based Activism 
CR-based activist groups taking the conventional firm level route can seek to advance 
their claims directly with the firm(s) whose practices they wish to change – for instance via 
boycotts or media campaigns aimed at raising public awareness about problematic practices – 
14 
with the goal of ultimately cascading CR change from the targeted firms to others in the same 
sector (Böhm, Spicer, and Fleming, 2008; den Hond and de Bakker, 2007). On the other 
hand, activist groups using the conventional field level route will seek to pressure public 
authorities to adopt more stringent legislation concerning the CR issue they aim to affect 
(Baron, 2001, 2003; Lyon and Maxwell, 2004; Reid and Toffel, 2009). We now examine how 
the existence of PRIs for a particular CR issue affects the possibilities of CR-based activist 
groups taking either of these two routes. 
 
Field level route. As PRIs regulate multiple firms, activist groups can take the field 
level route to bring about CR change. By targeting a PRI, and attempting to change its rules 
or control mechanisms, such groups can impact the multiple corporations participating in the 
focal PRI. Examining activism targeted at the state, Zald (2000) covers three field level 
possibilities: (1) participating or (2) not participating in the political process, and (3) creating 
new political parties. Similar possibilities are available to CR-based activist groups when 
private regulation exists: they can exert influence on PRIs using either (1) participatory or (2) 
non-participatory tactics (Aguilera, Rupp, Williams, and Ganapathi, 2007; Soule, 2009), but 
they can also (3) advocate the creation of new PRIs (see our Proposition 5 below). 
Participatory tactics consist of putting pressure on the PRI from within rather than 
from without, and therefore involve – as a first step – the formal engagement of the activist 
group in the governance of the focal PRIiii. In a second step, a participating activist group can 
use several means – e.g., lobbying, coalition-building, or participating in the diverse 
committees developing new or revising standards – to enhance the PRI’s capacity to address 
a CR issue effectively, and so ensure participating firms improve their CR activities. Hence 
the logic of these tactics (as opposed to that of non-participatory tactics) is more 
institutionalized and collaborative than disruptive.  
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In contrast, non-participatory tactics consist of putting pressure on the PRI from 
outside rather than from within – their logic is confrontational or disruptive, rather than 
collaborative. When CR-based activist groups use these tactics, their objective is to pressure 
the PRI via the media and public opinion to force it to revise its procedures and standards 
toward more stringent solutions for the CR issue at hand.  
 
Firm level route. Previous research has shown the importance of different firm and 
environmental variables when it comes to which firms activist groups are most likely to target 
(e.g. King, 2008a; King and Soule, 2007) – for example, large and highly visible firms are 
more likely to be targeted than their smaller counterparts, or business-to-business firms 
(Bartley and Child, 2011; Rehbein, Waddock, and Graves, 2004). Besides these traditional 
firm characteristics, we argue that PRIs offer CR-based activist groups important potential 
leverage solutions via the firm level route, as they can provide activist groups with powerful 
benchmarks against which they can evaluate a firm’s commitment to improving their 
performance on CR issues (Yaziji and Doh, 2009). Hence, activist groups can suggest 
participation in a PRI as a concrete solution to improving a firm’s commitment to CR. 
Indeed, successful activist mobilization not only involves the careful definition of a problem 
(Gusfield, 1981), but also the presentation of possible solutions to those problems (Snow and 
Benford, 1988). When firms are criticized with regard to a CR issue, providing them with 
potential solutions will make them more likely to change their CR behaviors. 
We suggest that whether CR-based activist groups use the leverage private regulation 
provides against a firm depends on whether they see that firm as proactive with regard to a 
CR issue, or as a laggard – and that such (non)proactivity is expressed by firm’s 
(non)participation in relevant PRIs (Scherer and Palazzo, 2011; Zadek, 2004), which in turn 
signals that they (don’t) accept some level of external authority over their CR activities 
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(Baron, 2003; Gilbert and Rasche, 2008). Thus CR-based activist groups using private 
regulation as a focal point can have two different types of firm targets: participating or non-
participating firms. However, firms can participate in PRIs in ways that involve accepting 
different degrees of authority and constraints on their activities, and these differences are also 
likely to impact on how activist groups perceive the degree of their proactivity. 
 
(b) Dimensions of Private Regulation Opportunity Structures 
As noted above, we draw on and adapt international POS to define PROS. Although 
PRIs are private in nature, their structures and processes have several similarities with those 
of governmental organizations, especially public international organizations (Abbott and 
Snidal, 2009a, b, 2010). Both are regulatory institutions, although neither have the same 
degree of ‘hard power’ as the state, and both – very often at least – have transnational 
dimensions. Just as in international organizations, PRIs are governed by a highest rule-
making body (like the UN General Assembly) which represents the stakeholders involved 
and usually makes decisions after deliberations (and sometimes voting) among those 
stakeholders, which also have policy-influencing mechanisms (e.g., sub-plenary committees 
providing recommendations for policy decisions). PRIs are formal organizations, typically 
managed by secretariats that provide guidelines for the enforcement of their rules, and deal 
with the initiatives’ day-to-day operations, in the same way as the executive organs of 
international organizations. Of course, PRIs and international organizations differ on a 
number of other dimensions, such as the type of stakeholders involved (e.g. firms or nations), 
their legitimacy, or origin. However, generally speaking, PRIs function in similar ways to 
multilateral international organizations when it comes to making and implementing decisions 
(i.e. their regulatory process) (Abbott and Snidal, 2009a). These similarities allow for the 
adaptation of knowledge about international organizations to PRIs (Mena and Palazzo, 2012; 
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Richardson and Eberlein, 2011; Risse, 2006) – so we can translate the four dimensions of 
international POS described above to PRIs, which we can define as their organizational 
structures, informal structures, rule adequacy, and output structure. Table 2 summarizes 
these dimensions and gives comparative examples from existing PRIs. 
 
--------------------------------------------- 
INSERT TABLE 2 ABOUT HERE 
--------------------------------------------- 
 
Organizational structure. As for international POS, how a PRI’s regulatory system is 
organized influences how activist groups can leverage that system to bring about change. 
Based on the literature on international opportunity structures (van der Heijden, 2006), we 
define a PRI’s organizational structure as its openness to formal participation by activist 
groups, ranging from open to closed. The degree of this openness can be measured by such 
characteristics as the type of its voting system (e.g. if only one type of stakeholders is allowed 
to vote in the general assembly) or the diversity of stakeholders included in its working 
groups on the development of standards. 
 
Informal structures. The informal structures and underlying processes of a regulatory 
body also matter for activist groups (Kriesi et al., 1992). As for international POS, the 
informal structures of an initiative relate to how integrative its decision-making procedures 
are, ranging from integrative to exclusive (Kriesi, 2004; van der Heijden, 2006). While 
activist groups might be included in PRIs’ formal processes, their decisions may be taken by 
elites who do not consider other interests. Hence, PRIs’ informal structures refer to the 
relation of power between constituents, which can be measured by, for example, the extent to 
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which decision-makers allow external stakeholders to voice their concerns, or the former’s 
attitudes towards certain groups in the PRI (King, 2008b).  
 
Rule adequacy. The extent to which different stakeholders perceive that a PRI’s rules 
are adequate to solve – or at least improve – a CR issue is another important PROS 
dimension. As for whether the public sees ideas in a polity as sensible or legitimate 
(Koopmans and Statham, 1999; Kriesi, 2004), a PRI’s rules also need to be perceived as 
adequate or legitimate (Mena and Palazzo, 2012). The rule adequacy of a PRI can be 
understood as its ability to “solve or ameliorate the problems at hand as well as consider and 
address important consequences of the decision itself” (Rucht, 2005, p. 219), ranging from 
inadequate to adequate. A PRI can be inadequate because its rules do not require firms to 
change their CR behavior sufficiently, are not adapted to rule-targets, or provoke problematic 
side-effects (Raines, 2003; Sethi, 2003; Vogel, 2010). A PRI’s rule adequacy could therefore 
be measured by, for example, the number of issues about which it is publicly criticized, or the 
extent to which stakeholders affected by an issue regulated by a PRI perceive it as dealing 
with that issue in a credible way. 
 
Output structure. We can describe the fourth dimension of PROS as a PRI’s output 
structure. As for international organizations (Kitschelt, 1986; Scharpf, 1999; van der Heijden, 
2006), a PRI’s output structure depends on the effectiveness of its rules, and refers to the 
strength with which it monitors and enforces its rules, ranging from weakly to strongly 
monitored (Mena and Palazzo, 2012; Richardson and Eberlein, 2011; Risse, 2006). In the 
context of PRIs, a strong output structure can be achieved by using independent third-party 
audits of rule enforcement, which are expected to encourage greater compliance than other 
forms of monitoring, such as self-monitoring by corporations (Marx, 2008; O'Rourke, 2006).  
19 
(c) Private Regulation Opportunity Structures and CR-based Activist Groups’ 
Activities 
We contend that activist groups evaluate PROS by comparing these four dimensions 
in the different PRIs that regulate CR issues (see examples in Table 2). This comparative 
perspective also aligns with international POS, which examine how activist groups compare 
different international organizations’ opportunity structures (van der Heijden, 2006). We 
argue that both radical and reformative activist groups evaluate PRIs whose PROS 
dimensions are more open, integrative, adequate, and strongly monitored as more appropriate 
solutions than more closed, exclusive, inadequate, and weakly monitored PRIs. Inclusive and 
open PRIs have been shown to develop more legitimate solutions to CR issues than do more 
exclusive and closed PRIs (Bäckstrand, 2006; Fransen, 2012; Mena and Palazzo, 2012; Risse, 
2006), and, in the same vein, the strength (particularly the independence) of monitoring is 
seen as a critical dimension in the effectiveness of the solutions PRIs provide (Gereffi et al., 
2001; Kolk and van Tulder, 2002).  
Not only does the comparison of PRIs along their PROS dimensions determine how 
effective the solutions they provide are perceived, but the ideology of CR-based activist 
groups matters as well. Radical activist groups are generally more critical toward PRIs than 
are their reformative counterpartsiv. Thus the relative evaluations of radical and reformative 
CR-based activist groups converge – both see PRIs whose PROS dimensions are more open, 
integrative, adequate, and strongly monitored as more likely to provide appropriate solutions 
than more closed, exclusive, inadequate, and weakly monitored PRIs. But they diverge when 
evaluating PRIs in absolute terms: radical activist groups are less inclined even to evaluate 
more open, integrative, adequate, and strongly monitored PRIs as acceptable solutions. We 
now examine the core of our framework, that is, how PROS affect the activities of CR-based 
activist groups that take private regulation as a focal point. 
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(i) PROS and the field level route. Reformative activist groups prefer to develop to 
their fullest potential those PRIs they perceive as currently offering more advanced – if not 
necessarily perfect – solutions to CR issues (Yaziji and Doh, 2009): those PRIs that are 
comparatively more open, integrative, adequate, and strongly monitored. Reformative activist 
groups favor participatory over non-participatory tactics in such PRIs, which reflects their 
preference for institutionalized and collaborative tactics. They are thus more likely, first, to 
engage with those PRIs and, second, to use participatory tactics within such initiatives. 
However, supporting the most advanced existing solutions sometimes also involves 
delegitimizing PRIs that offer less advanced solutions. While most of their activities are 
likely to center on the PRIs they deem worthy of support, reformative activist groups also use 
non-participatory tactics against PRIs whose PROS dimensions are more closed, exclusive, 
inadequate, and weakly monitored. For example, the WWF, considered a reformative activist 
group, helped create the Forest Stewardship Council (FSC) – a PRI setting standards for 
sustainable forest management – and participated in and supported this initiative. In contrast, 
the WWF has been much more critical toward another PRI dealing with the same issue – the 
industry-initiated Sustainable Forestry Initiative (SFI) – which is more exclusive and closed 
than the FSC (Walsh, 2006; see also Table 2).  
Favoring more far-reaching solutions than reformatives, radical activist groups usually 
attempt to delegitimize solutions that, while effective, still fall short of their own 
expectations, so as to improve them further, or to encourage the emergence of even more 
effective solutions. Thus, radicals are most likely to focus on PRIs whose PROS dimensions 
are comparatively more open, integrative, adequate, and strongly monitored. However, in 
contrast to reformative activist groups – and consistent with their preference for more 
disruptive action – radical activist groups will favor non-participatory over participatory 
tactics: in doing so, they aim both to improve those PRIs and/or pave the way for the 
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emergence of more stringent solutions. As is the case when targeting the state with non-
participatory tactics to pressure firms indirectly (Schurman, 2004; Zald, 2000), undermining 
the existing solutions for a CR issue that PRIs represent also puts indirect pressure on firms, 
both participating and non-participating, by discrediting the supposedly proactive CR 
practices endorsed by firms in these more advanced PRIs. Thus, in their efforts to bring about 
change in CR activities via the field level route, we propose that:  
 
Proposition 1. Both reformative and radical CR-based activist groups spend 
more time and resources targeting PRIs that are more open, integrative, 
adequate, and strongly monitored than others. 
 
In terms of tactics, comparing reformative and radical activist groups, we propose 
that: 
 
Proposition 2a. The more open, integrative, adequate, and strongly monitored a 
PRI is, the more likely reformative CR-based activist groups are to select 
participatory over non-participatory tactics when targeting this PRI.  
 
Proposition 2b. Regardless of a PRI’s opportunity structures, radical CR-based 
activist groups are more likely to select non-participatory over participatory 
tactics when targeting a PRI. 
 
 This last proposition is illustrated by two examples: the non-participatory and critical 
tactics adopted by the radical group Friends of the Earth toward the Roundtable of 
Sustainable Palm Oil, on the basis that this PRI is inadequate and does not contribute 
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effectively to solving the deforestation issue (Friends of the Earth, 2009); and, in contrast, the 
participatory and supportive tactics used by two reformative groups – Rainforest Action 
Network (RAN) and the WWF, which both prefer negotiation to confrontation – towards the 
above mentioned FSC. 
 
(ii) PROS and the firm level route. We have outlined above that the targeting of firms 
over CR issues depends largely on their perceived proactivity. Firms that participate in no 
PRIs at all are likely to be seen as laggards compared to those that engage, since the latter 
show some form of readiness to address the issue beyond individual firm level measures 
(Scherer and Palazzo, 2007; Zadek, 2004). By the same token, firms participating in PRIs that 
are comparatively more open, integrative, adequate, and strongly monitored are likely to be 
perceived as more proactive than those engaging with more closed, exclusive, inadequate, 
and weakly monitored PRIs (Behnam and MacLean, 2011; MacLean and Behnam, 2010).  
Thus, on the one hand, as radical activist groups are usually confrontational and 
concentrate their activities on requiring further improvements from proactive firms (Turcotte 
et al., 2007; Yaziji and Doh, 2009), they are more likely to target those that participate. 
Furthermore, such groups target firms that participate in PRIs that are comparatively more 
open, integrative, adequate, and strongly monitored compared to others, as they represent the 
current best practices with regard to a CR issue: by targeting those firms, radical activist 
groups look to push the initiatives in which these firms participate towards even more 
stringent rules. On the other hand (and as we propose above) reformative activist groups’ 
collaborative behavior translates into a higher propensity, first to engage in PRIs, and then to 
use participatory tactics to work within these initiatives. This does not prevent such groups 
from occasionally using confrontational tactics towards laggard firms (den Hond and de 
Bakker, 2007). When targeting such firms, reformative activist groups’ leverage the solutions 
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the most advanced PRIs represent as benchmarks with the aim to pressure laggard firms to 
participate in those PRIs. This happened, for example, when the WWF (participating in the 
FSC) launched a campaign against the operations of the global timber company Danzer in the 
Republic of Congo. The WWF’s objective was to persuade Danzer to participate in the FSC 
and have its concessions in Congo certified; a goal that was subsequently achieved (Châtel, 
2009; FSC-Watch, 2006). We therefore propose that, to promote CR change via the firm 
level route (depending on firms’ (non-) participation in PRIs): 
 
Proposition 3. Whereas radical CR-based activist groups spend more time and 
resources targeting participating firms, reformative CR-based activist groups 
spend more time and resources targeting non-participating firms. 
 
Following the above reasoning, radical and reformative activist groups are likely 
to prefer to target firms participating in PRIs with different opportunity structures. 
Comparing radical and reformative groups, we propose that: 
 
Proposition 4a. When targeting participating firms, radical CR-based activist 
groups spend more time and resources targeting firms in PRIs that are more 
open, integrative, adequate, and strongly monitored compared to others.  
 
Proposition 4b. When targeting participating firms, reformative CR-based 
activist groups spend more time and resources targeting firms in PRIs that are 
more closed, exclusive, inadequate, and weakly monitored compared to others. 
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(iii) PROS and advocacy for the creation of new PRIs. We have noted above that 
activist groups mobilizing against the state as a focal point can create new political parties 
(Zald, 2000). CR-based activist groups can use similar tactics when taking private regulation 
as a focal point: i.e., advocating a new and improved solution for a CR issue via the creation 
of a more stringent PRI than those that currently exist. As in state-directed activism, CR-
based activist groups are more likely to do so when the existing opportunity structures do not 
provide them with sufficiently positive prospects for change (Zald, 2000).  
Reformative CR-based activist groups face such a lack of opportunities when they 
deem none of the existing PRIs as worthy of their support – that is, when all PRIs regulating 
a CR issue are closed, exclusive, inadequate, and their rules weakly monitored. In such cases, 
reformative activist groups will be unable to improve CR behaviors via their preferred 
participatory tactics, as no extant PRI has effective regulatory power. As detailed previously, 
the process leading to the creation of a PRI depends on several enabling conditions. When 
favorable conditions are in place, reformative CR-based activist groups will therefore support 
the creation of a new PRI that they see as providing a more appropriate solution to the CR 
issue at hand – that is, a PRI whose PROS dimensions are more open, integrative, adequate, 
and strongly monitored than those of existing PRIs. We therefore propose that: 
 
Proposition 5. The more closed, exclusive, inadequate, and weakly monitored 
existing PRIs are, the more likely reformative CR-based activists are to advocate 
the creation of a new PRI. 
 
As opposed to reformative groups, radical CR-based activists prefer less 
institutionalized means of instigating change. Proposition 2 suggests that radical activist 
groups – who prefer disruptive tactics – are more likely to use non-participatory tactics. As 
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advocacy often entails participation in the future PRI, we argue that it is unlikely that radical 
activist groups will use advocacy, but will rather use scale shift.  
 
(iv) PROS and scale shift. When CR-based activist groups face unfavorable PROS, 
they have another possibility – to shift their scale of contention to other focal points (i.e. the 
state or the corporation). Reformative CR-based activist groups may resort to such solutions 
when all the PRIs in a target field are closed, exclusive, inadequate and weakly monitored. 
While they are likely to advocate the creation of new PRIs in such a situation (c.f. Proposition 
5), enabling conditions may be unfavorable, or such a creation process may be too slow to 
bring sufficient change, or might already have failed. In such cases, we argue that reformative 
groups will likely turn their efforts away from PRIs toward other available focal points.  
The same argument is valid for radical CR-based activist groups. When there are only 
relatively closed, exclusive, inadequate, and weakly monitored PRIs associated with a CR 
issue, radical activist groups cannot target their preferred PRI targets – usually those which 
are more open, integrative, adequate, and strongly monitored PRIs – nor their preferred firm 
targets – those participating in such PRIs. In such situations – just as their reformative 
counterparts – radical activist groups are likely to shift their activities to other focal points, so 
we propose that: 
 
Proposition 6. Whereas radical CR-based activist groups are likely to engage in 
scale shift the more closed, exclusive, inadequate, and weakly monitored existing 
PRIs are, reformative CR-based activist groups will only do so when not 
advocating the creation of new PRIs. 
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DISCUSSION 
In this article, we examine how private regulation initiatives have become a new focal 
point for activist groups aiming to pressure firms to improve their CR engagement. We have 
detailed the dimensions of private regulation opportunity structures (PROS) and examined 
how they affect the activities of reformative and radical CR-based activist groups. We have 
conceptualized four main activities of activist groups: (i) taking the field level route and 
targeting PRIs by using either participatory or non-participatory tactics towards PRIs, (ii) 
taking the firm level route and targeting participating or non-participating firms, (iii) 
advocating the creation of new PRIs, and (iv) shifting the scale of contention to other focal 
points. We have underlined how the ideology of activist groups and the opportunity structures 
of existing PRIs determine activist groups’ choices of where to allocate most of their time 
and resources among these four activities. We now discuss three issues that our framework 
does not explicitly address: how activist groups that participate in PRIs are likely to behave at 
the firm level; the potential role that ideological changes in activist groups may play; and 
how an evaluative assessment of PRIs could complement our contribution. 
 
Participation of Activist Groups in PRIs and the Firm Level Route  
We have noted that the firm level route is another way for CR-based activist groups to 
bring change at the field level, i.e. to change the processes of PRIs or to extend their coverage 
to additional firms so as ultimately to change the practices of multiple firms (den Hond and 
de Bakker, 2007). Targeting firms may seem contradictory to CR-based activist groups’ 
participation in PRIs; but, as the example of WWF (an FSC participant) and Danzer above 
illustrates, CR-based activists are still able to target individual firms while participating in 
PRIs, which raises the question of whether activist groups could face a conflict of interest 
when co-opted to participate in PRIs. 
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We contend that our Propositions 3 and 4 concerning activist groups taking the firm 
level route also hold when they participate in PRIs. Reformative activist groups are more 
likely either to target firms that do not participate in PRIs at all, or that participate in PRIs 
that are less advanced than those in which the activist group participates (Propositions 3 and 
4b). Hence, the potential for a conflict of interest between reformative activist groups’ 
participation in PRIs and their targeting of individual firms can be expected to be a relatively 
minor issue, since they are unlikely to target firms participating in the same PRIs as 
themselves.  
Radical activist groups are, first, much less likely than their reformative counterparts 
to participate in PRIs (Proposition 2), and, second, would only participate in PRIs that have 
extensive authority and decisive power over the firms they regulate (i.e., which are very open, 
integrative, adequate, and strongly monitored), and in which the activist groups themselves 
have greater decision-making weight than the participating firms. Under such circumstances, 
it would seem less necessary for radical activist groups to target participating firms because 
they themselves hold the power within the PRI (by using participatory tactics) to force those 
firms to improve their CR behaviors. In such situations, radical activist groups might target 
individual firms, which are not participants in the same PRIs as they are. However (as per our 
Propositions 3 and 4) radical activist groups taking the firm level route will likely spend most 
of their time and resources targeting firms that participate in open, integrative, adequate and 
strongly monitored PRIs. As radical activist groups would only themselves participate in such 
PRIs, it is therefore less likely, overall, that they would target individual firms in these 
situations. 
 
Ideological Change  
Another issue that our conceptualization does not address directly is the possibility of 
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ideological change within activist groups as a result of their participation in PRIs. Social 
movement theory has shown that, over long periods, reformative groups that participate in 
existing state structures tend to become more moderate – and, likewise, that radical activists 
operating outside state institutions can become even more radical as a result of repression 
(Koopmans, 2004; Whetten et al., 2009).  
However, extant research has also shown that ideological change is by no means 
trivial, and can face important obstacles, such as routines, organizational inertia (Hannan and 
Freeman, 1977), and – particularly important for our context – the question of core 
constituents’ endorsement of the organization’s ideology. Yaziji and Doh (2013) show that 
activist groups’ radicalism is strongly influenced by resource providers (e.g. donors): to the 
extent that these providers’ stances remains stable, it would be highly unlikely that the 
ideology of activist groups will change significantly. Another important aspect to consider is 
that, although internal conflicts over their ideological direction are frequent phenomena in 
activist groups, such conflicts do not lead to ideological change in many cases, but rather to 
the foundation by dissidents of new activist groups (Fantasia and Stepan-Norris, 2004; Rucht, 
2004). While ideological change has been shown to be a consequence of shifting values in 
both the environments in which activist groups are embedded and those of their core 
constituents and resource providers (Zald and Ash, 1966), such processes generally occur 
over relatively extended time periods. Despite short-term ideological change in activist 
groups being less likely, future research should address longitudinal aspects of activist 
groups’ interactions with PRIs. 
 
Evaluative Assessment of PRIs  
An important point to note is that our conceptualization is a descriptive endeavor. 
While its implications do not allow for excessively optimistic conclusions of how the 
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interactions between CR-based activist groups and PRIs can affect the level and 
substantiveness of firms’ CR engagement, a more critical or evaluative approach could shed 
additional light on our phenomenon of interest. For example, we have concentrated on 
describing contention between activist groups, firms, and PRIs once the latter are in place: by 
definition, this focus excludes an in-depth analysis of the conditions and power struggles 
underpinning PRIs’ creation (see e.g. Bartley, 2007; Helms et al., 2012; Zietsma and 
McKnight, 2009).  
In the same vein, our analysis concentrates on activist groups rather than individuals. 
From a critical point of view, this could raise important questions. For instance, we know that 
mobilization is a precondition for sustained interactions with power holders (McCarthy and 
Zald, 1977). At the same time, the formation of activist groups and their continuance over 
time require important resources (Edwards and McCarthy, 2004). However, the most 
vulnerable and marginalized segments of the world’s population rarely have access to such 
resources, and so have trouble voicing their concerns and making them heard by power 
holders. They can be assumed not to be well represented either in the creation of PRIs or in 
the subsequent contentions between activist groups and firms. Such marginalized voices have 
to rely on more organized activist groups to bring their concerns to the attention of power 
holders such as firms and PRIs. However, past research has shown that the representation of 
marginalized stakeholders by established activist groups can suffer from serious flaws (Khan, 
Munir, and Willmott, 2007). Hence, a more normative or evaluative approach to our 
phenomenon of interest could be, on the one hand, to assess under what circumstances more 
organized activist groups’ representation of marginalized stakeholders’ interests yields 
substantial results for those stakeholders; and on the other, to aim to understand what other 
means marginalized stakeholders might have to gain access to PRIs when representation via 
more organized activist groups proves unsatisfactory.  
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Conclusion 
The extant literature to date has largely portrayed PRIs as stabilizing solutions for 
firms, in the sense that their agreement to participate in PRIs can lead to the pacification of 
their previously contentious relationships with CR-based activist groups (e.g. Baron, 2003; 
Bartley, 2007; Scherer and Palazzo, 2007, 2011; Wright and Rwabizambuga, 2006). By 
contrast, we underline the continuation of contention and conflict – even after PRIs are 
created – and so contribute to a more dynamic view of CR and PRIs, which are both 
constantly in flux and never conclusively defined.  
Current research underlines the positive consequences of firms’ engagement in PRIs, 
such as enhanced reputation, competitive advantage, or as buffers against pressures (Fombrun 
et al., 2000; McWilliams et al., 2006; Wright and Rwabizambuga, 2006). Scherer and 
Palazzo, while talking about adequately representative and fair PRIs, mention that corporate 
engagement “helps to pre-empt potential conflicts between a corporation and its societal 
environment” – but they also note that “stakeholder conflicts do not vanish” (2007, p. 1109) 
necessarily as a result. Indeed, whereas an expectation of positive consequences might 
constitute initial justifications for firms’ participation in PRIs, our conceptualization shows 
that there are also unintended consequences of such engagement. While firms may initially 
see private regulation as a solution to current problems, these very solutions can subsequently 
become channels through which activist groups pressure firms toward making further CR 
commitments (Turcotte et al., 2007). While we do not question that there can be benefits to 
firms from participating in PRIs, we contribute to the CR literature by pointing toward a more 
complete view of the implications of their engagement.  
We also contribute to social movement theory, by extending the literature on POS to 
the realm of private regulation. Current conceptualizations of POS (King, 2008b; Schurman, 
2004; Soule, 2009, 2012b; van der Heijden, 2006) neither consider nor capture how private 
31 
regulation affects activism, despite PRIs’ potential regulatory power to address CR issues. 
Given that PRIs are increasingly becoming the yardsticks for advanced types of firms’ CR 
engagements (Scherer and Palazzo, 2011), and, at the same time, that social movement 
theorists are taking an increasing interest in the topic of CR (Soule, 2009), we believe our 
article provides a fruitful extension of the burgeoning literature at the intersection between 
social movement theory, CR, and private regulation. 
However, our conceptualization has some limitations, which can offer interesting 
avenues for future research. We have not looked in detail at the internal dynamics of 
contention within PRIs. Further research on the underlying processes, dynamics, and power 
struggles located in and around PRIs is needed in order to better understand issues of the 
politicization (Scherer and Palazzo, 2007) or de-politicization (Edward and Willmott, 2008) 
of firms’ roles in governance, the marginalization of interests (Banerjee, 2007; Dingwerth, 
2008), and the co-optation of non-profit interests by corporate ones (Shamir, 2010). For 
example, while we have provided arguments with regard to CR-based activist groups’ use of 
participatory tactics, future research should address in more detail firms’ and activist groups’ 
strategic decisions to join, leave, or sustain their participation in PRIs – and the contentions 
underpinning such choices. A particularly interesting research endeavor would be to 
investigate how an activist group’s decision to participate in a PRI influences micro-
processes within the group, such as the distribution of power and resources among its 
individual members. 
Nor does our conceptualization of PROS fully consider that a corporation may be 
concerned with several different CR issues – and might adhere to a PRI for one specific issue, 
but not for others. In those cases, CR-based activist groups might use one issue to cascade 
their campaigns onto other issues they feel the focal firm is not dealing with adequately 
(Bonardi and Keim, 2005). For instance, activist groups have been shown to target 
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corporations that have recently sustained reputational damage for issues unrelated to their 
focal campaigns (King, 2008a). Further research could address the relationship between 
issues, PRIs, firm engagement, and activism more comprehensively. In the same vein, it 
would be interesting to study how PRIs affect the framing processes and rhetorical strategies 
that underpin activist groups’ tactics (Haack, Schoeneborn, and Wickert, 2012; Snow and 
Benford, 1988; Suddaby and Greenwood, 2005). 
Finally, our conceptual framework allows for extensive empirical operationalization. 
Field level quantitative studies can test our propositions, using sustainable forest 
management, labor standards, or the mining industry (for example) as research settings, given 
the number of PRIs emerging in those areas. We suggest that a content analysis of criticism 
in relevant media is an appropriate starting point for data collection on activism against firms 
and PRIs. PROS can be operationalized by qualitatively examining the different dimensions 
in existing PRIs, and different activist groups’ perception of these dimensions (by examining 
their reports on focal topics, for example). Such enquiries would allow for the sketching of a 
clearer picture of the differences in the politics of regulation and corporate responsibility 
across diverse issues and markets. 
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NOTES
 
i
 We do not consider the category in which governmental institutions govern PRIs on their 
own, as such PRIs are assimilable to international organizations (Abbott and Snidal provide 
the example of the ILO or the OECD). The opportunity structures for activism targeted at 
such organizations have already been covered elsewhere (e.g. van der Heijden, 2006), and 
we draw on these conceptions to develop private regulation opportunity structures. 
ii
 Whereas institutional theories emphasize how the environment shapes organizational 
behaviors – and tends towards stability – social movement theory rather emphasizes 
challenger organizations’ attempts to alter their environments – and so promote change 
(King, 2008b). Although more recent neo-institutional studies also examine change 
processes, they typically focus on examining how incumbent actors can come to realize the 
possibility of alternatives to the status quo, rather than – as social movement theory does – 
on the political and contentious processes involved in pushing for change in institutional 
environments. An exception is the literature on institutional entrepreneurship, which does 
focuses on political processes: but part of this literature has recently been criticized heavily 
because it seems to conflict with a basic premise of neo-institutional theory – that 
institutions make it hard for actors to envision alternatives to the status quo (Aldrich, 2011; 
Suddaby, 2010). 
iii
 Some PRIs exclude activists groups from participation, in which case these tactics are not 
possible. 
iv
 We only consider PRIs that neither reformative nor radical activist groups see as perfect and 
definitive solutions to CR issues. While such perfect PRIs could exist in theory, in reality it 
is highly unlikely that PRIs could provide complete solutions to CR issues. And if such 
perfect PRIs existed, they would no longer attract criticism by CR-based activists as they 
 
34 
 
would have solved the CR issues involved – and so would fall outside the scope of this 
article. 
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FIGURE 1 
A Framework of Private Regulation as a Focal Point for CR-based Activism 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
51 
TABLE 1 
Examples of Existing PRIs Following Abbott and Snidal’s Categorizationa 
Stakeholders participating in 
governance of the PRI PRI CR issue Date of 
creation Firms Civil society 
organizations 
Govern
ments 
x   
Responsible Care 
Sustainable Forestry Initiative 
Sustainability in the chemical industry 
Sustainable forest management 
1987 
1994 
 x  
Workers’ Rights Consortium 
GoodWeave (formerly RugMark) 
Working conditions in the apparel industry 
Child labor-free certification of rugs’ fabrication  
2000 
1994 
x x  
Fair Labor Association 
Forest Stewardship Council 
Working conditions in the apparel industry 
Sustainable forest management 
1999 
1993 
x  x 
United Nations Global Compact 
Equator Principles 
CR guidelines 
Sustainable financing of bank projects 
1999 
2003 
 x x Principles for Responsible Investment CR guidelines for investors 2006 
x x x 
Extractive Industry Transparency 
Initiative 
Kimberley Process 
Transparency of money transfers between 
governments and extractive firms 
Certification of conflict-free diamonds 
2002 
 
2003 
a Adapted from Abbott and Snidal (2009a; 2009b; 2010) 
 
 
 
 
 
52 
TABLE 2 
Definitions and Examples of Private Regulation Opportunity Structures 
Dimension of 
PROS 
Definition Value Examples of indicators Examples of PRIs (CR issue) 
Organizational 
structure 
Openness to formal 
participation by 
activist groups 
Open <--> 
Closed 
Type of voting system 
Repartition of votes between different 
constituents 
Structure of the general assembly 
The Voluntary Principles on Security 
and Human Rights are more open 
than the Global Business Initiative on 
Human Rights (CR issue: human 
rights) 
Informal 
structures 
Integrativeness of the 
decision making 
processes 
Integrative <--> 
Exclusive 
Openness of the general assembly to the 
public 
Transparency (e.g. general assembly or 
board meeting minutes publicly 
available) 
The Forest Stewardship Council is 
more integrative than the Sustainable 
Forestry Initiative (CR issue: 
sustainable forest management) 
Rule adequacy Extent to which the 
PRI’s rules contribute 
to solving the issue 
with the minimum 
amount of negative 
externalities 
Adequate <--> 
Inadequate 
Number/extent of negative externalities 
created by the rules 
Extent and coverage of root-cause 
identification and solving 
Amount of public criticism of the rules  
The Rainforest Alliance is more 
adequate than Responsible Cocoa 
(CR issue: sustainable cocoa farming) 
Output 
structure 
Strength of 
enforcement and 
monitoring of the 
PRI’s rules 
Strongly 
monitored <--> 
Weakly 
monitored 
Type of monitoring 
Presence of further verification 
procedures 
Independence and/or accreditation of 
monitoring organizations 
Stringency of reporting requirements 
The Workers’ Rights Consortium is 
more strongly monitored than the 
Worldwide Responsible Apparel 
Production (CR issue: working 
conditions in the apparel industry) 
 
 
